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Failure or Simply Inaction?
Tatsuo YAMANE*
<Book Review>
Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails
New York, Palgrave, 2001, 236pp, $18.95, ISBN 0-312-23942-4
Dennis C. Jett's near 30-year career in the Foreign Service-including as U.S. Ambas-
sador to Mozambique from 1993-1996-is fully put to use in Why Peacekeeping Fails. (His
final assignment wi也the State Department was as Diplomat in Residence and senior
advisor on Africa at The Carter Center in Atlanta, a policy oriented institution founded
almost 20 years ago to reduce conflict and alleviate suffering in the world.) Not only is
this book a sort of memoir written by a diplomat involved in the events discussed, but it
also makes an important academic contribution in that it originally was written as a
doctoral dissertation in international relations from the University of Witwatersrand in
J ohannesburg, South Africa.
Why Peaceke砂ing Fails examines why some peacekeeping operations of the United
Nations fail by comparing the unsuccessful attempt at peacekeeping in Angola from
1989 with the successful effort in Mozambique from 1992 to 1994. While the author
explains that the multidimensional peacekeeping operations, by which the UN and inter-
national community have to deal almost exclusively with intrastate conflicts with failed
governments, would have difficulties in avoiding failures in the implementation, in the
conclusion, he suggests that peacekeeping in the future will be underutilized because of
its failure to meet all the expectations placed on it in the past.
This work consists of nine chapters, as well as a foreword in which recent develop-
ments, such as the Millennium Summit, the opening session of the 55th UN General
Assembly in 2000, and也e Brahimi Report issued in August 2000, are discussed with Jett
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stressing the necessity of organizational reform in order for the UN to do a better job at
peacekeeping.
Following the Introduction, which forms Chapter One, Chapter Two briefly reviews
the history of peacekeeping operations, describing the evolution in the number, size,
scope, and cost of such operations, and examinies how these characteristics have
evolved as a result of the end of the Cold War and changes in the world's conflicts to
those of an intrastate nature.
Chapter Three looks at how, when, and where the UN decides to intervene with
peacekeeping forces, and argues ,that these factors can influence the operation's chances
of success even when peacekeepers have already been committed and are on也e ground.
Jett observes how elements such as Security Council politics, the PKO's mandate, the
role of the Secretary General and the Special Representative, as well as pressure exerted
by the media and public opinion, can affect the operation's eventual outcome.
The predeployment factors specific to the cases of Angola and Mozambique are taken
up in Chapter Four. These include the history of each conflict and the way in which
parties to the conflicts negotiated their respective peace agreements. Even though bo仙
countries obtained their independence from Portugal in similar ways, the difference in
local actors言nternal resources, and external forces all contributed to making the peace
agreements ending their civil wars very different and, in the case of Angola, far more
difficult to implement. In particular, unlike Angola, the operation in Mozambique had a
large staff, ample resources, and a clear mandate giving it overall responsibility for the
peace process.
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven cover the period when the peacekeepers have deployed.
Separately, Chapter Five considers the factors血at the UN can control, such as who is
chosen to lead the operation, who is to participate in it, what the mandate is, how they
can interpret it, and how well they accomplish it. Chapter Six looks at external factors
beyond its control (but not beyond its influence) such as the commitment of the parties
to the peace process. Chapter Seven discusses the general case of humanitarian action
and how it can help or hinder the effectiveness of也e peacekeepers.
Chapter Eight deals with the phase that begins following the operation. The post-
deployment period after a PKO mission is not usually considered the responsibility of
peacekeepers. Jett questions this by asking "But can a PKO be considered a success if it
simply avoids obvious failure for as long as the peacekeepers are on the ground? If,
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after they depart, the peace proves unsustainable, the international community will have
little to show for its investment."
Consequently, as anりinconclusion," the final chapter attempts to draw some conclusions
while at the same time considering whether the contrast between the two outcomes in
Mozambique and Angola is as stark as conventional wisdom suggests. This last chapter
tries to analyze the difficulty involved in improving the chances for success and the in-
ability of the UN to adopt necessary changes for avoiding the failure of peacekeeping
missions. Jett argues that "implementation is a problem that frequently is not fully over-
come, and until it is better understood, peacekeeping will continue to be less of an
instrument of the international community than it otherwise could be."
It is important to note that this work is primarily concerned with examining two
peacekeeping missions in Africa, which were deployed at a time when foreign interest in
African affairs was in general decline due to the end of the Cold War. Jett's analysis of
peacekeeping accurately illuminates both the achievements and shortcomings of the two
missions before, during, and after each deployment. This is a very important work for
examining conflict resolution, since many studies address the causes of the ineffectiveness
of peacekeeping missions during their deployment. His point that, even under a feasible
mandate, a peacekeeping operation is likely to fail without adequate disarmament and
the demobilization of parties to the conflict, like in Angola is well made.
The UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) , from 1991 to 1995, was charged
with verifying that three objectives were being accomplished: military demobilization,
police neutrality, and the holding of fair elections. When the parties to the war in Angola
failed to achieve the first two objectives, the UN attempted to hold elections but the
rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rejected the
"unfair" result of the election and resumed using military force. This implies that it is
necessary to examine the situation prior to deployment-why a "Verification Mission"
with a weak mandate was deployed to Angola-and the situation after withdrawal.
Problems that were not solved during the mission will likely remain unresolved after-
wards too.
However, when we consider the future of peacekeeping operations with mandates
involving multi-functional objectives, their use in situations with little or no peace to
keep before, during, and after deployment must also be looked at. Jett mentions that "if
the conditions for lasting peace have not been created, the work of the operation can be
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undone rapidly following its conclusion." Does this mean that the option of inaction
should be chosen if there remain factors that may contribute to the possible failure of a
peacekeeping operation? The author, in concentrating on how peacekeeping fails, does
not always describe tangibly how it succeeds. Furthermore, the author does not ade-
quately discuss the broadening of the role of peacekeeping and only marginally recog一
mzes the possible utility of the concepts of peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforce-
ment, protective engagement, and peacebuilding. In this connection, one might consult
Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution edited by Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham,
which analyses a conceptual reconsideration of widespread peacekeeping operations.
Finally, if we address questions of conflict resolution in the international community,
it is necessary to consider not only peacekeeping, but also other stages of conflict
resolution, such as prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding. The UN did not com-
pletely abandon Angola. After也e withdrawal of the peacekeeping operation, the UN
Office in Angola (UNOA) was created to liaise with the political, military, police, and
other civilian authorities in that country. In December 2001, Ibrahim Gambari, UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Special Adviser for Africa, visited Angola, and held
extensive discussions with representatives of the Angolan government and others.
Gambari stated in the Security Council after his visit that "although the humanitarian
situation in Angola has deteriorated, there is currently a window of opportunity for re-
launching the peace process," pointing out that sanctions against UNITA have been an
important tool for attempting to secure the return of UNITA to the political process.
Moreover, he noted that the Angolan government would not object to a church role in
facilitating contacts with UNITA through也e UN. Even if peace operations end in
"failure," it is important to explore how a proactive role by the UN can help to rekindle
the peace process in the absence of stronger measures.
